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Abstract—Docker is a virtualization technique heavily used in industry to build cloud-based systems. In the context of Docker, a
system is said observable if engineers can get accurate information about the running state in production. In this paper, we present a
novel approach, called POBS, to automatically improve the observability of Dockerized Java applications. POBS is based on
automated transformations of Docker configuration files. Our approach injects additional modules in the production application, in order
to provide better observability. We evaluate POBS by applying it on open-source Java applications which are containerized with
Docker. Our key result is that 223/248 (90%) of Docker Java containers can be automatically augmented with better observability.
Index Terms—observability, monitoring, docker, production systems
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1 INTRODUCTION
DOCKER is a virtualization technique heavily used inindustry to build cloud-based systems [33], and in
software engineering research to improve reproducibility
[18], [26]. The main reason behind its success is that it
encapsulates dependencies, it simplifies deployment, and
its stateless nature increases reliability. As such, Docker is
an important technology behind the so-called ‘continuous
deployment’ advocated by the DevOps movement [24].
Docker is a layer directly on top of the operating system,
and can be used with many programming languages and
runtimes, including Java [7]. Packaging Java applications
inside Docker containers is currently one of the major trends
in enterprise systems [40].
Observability is a major challenge for cloud-based sys-
tems [14]. The observability problem means that it is hard
for engineers to get accurate information about the running
state in production. In the old days of monolithic applica-
tions, engineers only had to look at one single process and
its log file to monitor a service. Now, imagine dozens of
Docker nodes, independently built by different teams and
asynchronously deployed by an orchestration system such
as Kubernetes: it becomes really hard to understand what
happens in production [14]. To identify the root-cause of
bugs and performance bottlenecks, this lack of observability
can become a show-stopper [17]. In this paper, we improve
the engineering of Java applications that are packaged and
deployed with Docker.
We propose a technique, called ‘POBS’ (standing for
imProved OBServability), to statically analyze and trans-
form Docker configuration files of Java applications in or-
der to inject observability capabilities. Our key insight is
to leverage the declarative nature of Docker configuration
files. POBS consists of parsing Docker configuration files
and injecting tailored Docker configuration directives. Those
additional directives start different modules that improve
observability. Our approach is fully automated, it addresses
the typical case in industry of having many dockerized
Java applications, automatically packaged and continuously
deployed with Docker. To our knowledge, POBS is the first-
ever technique to automatically improve the observability of
Docker applications in cloud-based systems with automated
Docker file transformation.
We perform a large scale empirical evaluation of POBS,
by applying it to real-world open-source dockerized Java
applications. We first curate a set of 248 Java application
Docker configuration files. Next, we apply our technique to
all of them. Our key result is that POBS automatically adds
observability capabilities to 223/248 applications (90%),
demonstrating the wide applicability of our approach.
To sum up, our contributions are:
• an original empirical study of the usage of Docker
for Java applications in open-source projects, showing
the extreme popularity of a handful of Docker base
images: the 25 most popular base images cover 40.5%
of applications. To our knowledge, this is the first study
of this kind in the literature.
• a novel approach, called POBS, for automatically
adding observability in Dockerized Java applications,
based on automated transformation of Docker configu-
ration files. The concept of automatically transforming
Docker files is highly novel, and to nurture this research
direction, we provide the community with a publicly-
available prototype implementation for future research.
• an evaluation of POBS on 248 real Dockerized Java
applications found on GitHub, showing that 223/248
(90%) of these applications can be augmented with
better observability, in an automated manner. Our idea
of transforming Docker configuration files is applicable
in practice and relevant for industry.
• an original qualitative case study on using improved
observability in Dockerized Java applications for as-
sessing resilience with low overhead.
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2.1 Docker
In modern software development pipelines, containeriza-
tion tools such as Docker have become increasingly pop-
ular 1 as they allow applications to be packaged along with
their dependencies and configuration as one standalone
entity. These entities, called containers in Docker, can be
shipped and deployed to a host and run as a process along
with other containers, sharing the same underlying oper-
ating system kernel but with their own private filesystem.
Compared with virtualization-based on virtual machines,
containerization is a more lightweight and scalable ap-
proach.
Base image
"foo" Application container
Docker image registry
FROM foo
...
RUN ...
COPY ...
EXPOSE ...
ENTRYPOINT ...
Application configuration (Dockerfile)
docker build
Application image
docker run
docker push
docker pull
Fig. 1: Lifecycle of a Docker Application
Figure 1 summarizes a typical Docker lifecycle. A devel-
oper first defines a Dockerfile. This file includes a mandatory
FROM instruction, which defines a base image. The file also
specifies all the instructions needed to build 2 a Docker image
for an application. Each instruction in a Dockerfile (RUN,
COPY, EXPOSE, ENTRYPOINT, ...) forms a new layer atop
the previous one.
When a Dockerfile such as the one in Listing 1 is defined,
it is possible to build a Docker image. This build process
consists of following each of the instructions in the Dock-
erfile, some of which may import resources from the host.
The Docker image can then be shipped and instantiated as
a container. The entire infrastructure for an application can
thus be determined by its Docker image. Developers can
make Docker images available on registries, the largest one
being Docker Hub.
A base image is the foundation on which develop-
ers build their application Docker images. Given the crit-
ical role of base images, Docker, Inc. maintains a cu-
rated set of official images 3 for essential operating sys-
tems, programming languages, and database runtime en-
vironments. Besides these official images, any organization
can publish images of its applications to Docker Hub,
such as anapsix/alpine-java, azul/zulu-openjdk,
or cloudunit/base-jessie to name a few. Both official
images and images published by organizations are ver-
sioned and can be used as base images.
1 FROM openjdk:8-jdk
2 RUN install-dep.sh
3 COPY my-app.jar /
4 ...
5 EXPOSE 8080
1. As of this writing, Docker has more than 32,000 stars on GitHub
and nearly 105 billion container downloads
2. https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/builder
3. https://hub.docker.com/search/?q=&type=image&image_filter=
official
6 ENTRYPOINT ["java", "-jar", "my-app.jar"]
Listing 1: A Basic Application Dockerfile
2.2 Observability for Resilience Engineering
Observability [31] is the ability to collect information about
the internal state of a software system based on its external
behavior. Observability is essential for root cause analysis
of problems and for resilience engineering in general. The
more information engineers get, the more accurately can
they deduce the relationship between a failure and its im-
pact on the system and the end-user. The observability of
a software system can be described at different levels: 1) on
the operating system level, where metrics like CPU, memory
usage, and I/O are considered, 2) on the service level, where
the functionality of a single machine or service is monitored,
e.g. does the service reply to a specific request (health-
check), and 3) on the application level, where multiple nodes
are monitored, e.g. with distributed tracing.
Let us dwell on resilience engineering. In this paper,
we adopt the definition of Trivedi, who states resilience as
“the persistence of service delivery that can justifiably be
trusted, when facing changes.” [41] For resilience engineer-
ing, developers apply fault injection techniques to actively
trigger the error-handling logic. For example, developers
can change bits in memory to evaluate how an operating
system tolerates memory errors [22].
Resilience engineering is a costly endeavor for devel-
opers. To gain observability, developers need to configure
different monitoring and tracing frameworks, both in source
code and in the runtime environment [20]. Additionally, to
experiment with fault injection, developers need to insert
fault injection tools or implement their own fault injectors,
which is a tedious and error-prone task [27].
3 EMPIRICAL STUDY OF DOCKERIZED JAVA AP-
PLICATIONS
This section describes an original empirical analysis of
Dockerized Java applications. The goal of this study is
to analyze the usage of base images in open-source Java
projects that use Docker. To our knowledge, ours is the first-
ever study of this kind. By analyzing how popular open-
source projects use Docker, we extract unique insights about
this active software ecosystem much used in industry.
3.1 Methodology
First, we have queried GitHub to collect the top 1000
repositories, sorted by the number of stars, that fulfill the
following criteria: 1) Java is their primary programming
language, 2) they mention “Docker” in their README.
This latter criterion indicates that they are likely to have
at Dockerfiles that build images for their application.
Second, in order to extract data from the Dockerfiles,
if any, we clone those repositories. If there exist releases
associated with a given repository, we checkout the code
corresponding to the latest release version. If no release
exists, we checkout the default branch of the repository
at the latest commit. This results in 434 repositories being
cloned at the commit corresponding to the latest release,
and 566 repositories being cloned at the latest commit on
the default branch, as of July 09, 2020.
33.2 Results
Of the 1000 repositories that were cloned, we find that
420 do not have a Dockerfile. A manual investigation re-
veals that there are repositories that mention Docker in the
README but do not use it, there are a number of reasons
for this: they may be a tutorial, they may provide support
for Docker with manual actions from users, or they may
keep the Docker configuration in a separate repository.
The remaining 580 repositories have at least one Docker-
file, with the total number of Dockerfiles being 2071. On an-
alyzing these repositories, we observe that 314/580 (51.1%)
of them have exactly one Dockerfile. Five repositories have
more than 40 Dockerfiles, with the maximum number of
Dockerfiles being 99. This happens if an application is large
and has many services or modules all packaged as separate
Docker containers.
Next, we measure the frequency of base images in the
Dockerfiles in our dataset. For this, we collect their names
from the FROM instruction. We extract 2295 FROM instruc-
tions and the corresponding base images from our dataset,
of which 692 images are unique.
Figure 2 shows the 25 most frequently occurring base
images. Axis Y depicts a base image and Axis X depicts
the number of its occurrences in our dataset. The most
popular base image is java:8 meaning the version 8 of
base image java. This confirms that our selection criteria
work as expected. We observe that the popularity is very
skewed: We observe at least one occurrence of one of these
25 images in 929/2295 (40.5%) of all base images in our
dataset, indicating a skewed distribution. We find that 23/25
(92%) of these are listed as official images on Docker Hub,
showing that developers prefer to use official images as they
are well-documented and intensively reviewed for security
vulnerabilities. Those official images are represented with
purple and blue bars in Figure 2. Next, our analysis reveals
that 18/25 (72%) of the most popular base images come
with some version of Java pre-installed, suggesting that de-
velopers prefer to use base images that are already tailored
for Java applications. In Figure 2, we show the pre-installed
java version on the right side of the bars, clearly showing
the dominance of openjdk, likely because of its friendly
redistribution license 4.
To sum up, for Java applications, the majority of devel-
opers rely on a small number of base images, with Java
pre-installed. This confirms the feasibility of our project: by
manipulating base images, we can augment a large number
of Dockerized Java applications.
3.3 Curated Dataset of Java Application Dockerfiles
We leverage on this empirical study to build a dataset
usable for evaluating our contribution on engineering Java
application Dockerfiles. In this section, we report on our
effort to curate a set of Java application Dockerfiles that fits
this need.
The first prerequisite for evaluating POBS on real-world
application Dockerfiles is that these Dockerfiles should be
4. Note that pull access was denied for the image
frolvlad/alpine-oraclejdk8:slim, preventing us from
determining the java version, see https://github.com/
Docker-Hub-frolvlad/docker-alpine-java
Fig. 2: The 25 most popular base images across 2071 Docker-
files in the dataset. The Java version that comes pre-installed
with the image, if any, is indicated. Official vendor images
are represented as purple or blue bars.
buildable in our lab environment without any modifica-
tions, using a uniform build command: docker build -t
TAG_NAME -f DOCKERFILE .. The second prerequisite is
to have Dockerfiles used to execute java applications (as
opposed to Dockerfiles used for testing, such as a Dockerfile
that sets up a MySql server for unit testing). Hence, we
exclude these Dockerfiles that are not meant to run a Java
process by checking the presence of java processes in the
initialized container.
Here are the results over all the 2071 Dockerfiles col-
lected in subsection 3.2. We observe that 810/2071 (39%)
Dockerfiles are buildable with a default docker build
command. The most common failure, which occurs in
805/2071 of failed cases, is “no such file or directory”.
It means that instructions like COPY or ADD fail to find
the target file, because it comes from a custom command.
Another common failure is “returned a non-zero code”,
which occurs in 198/2071 failing cases. The reasons for this
failure are numerous, with no dominant cause. The rest of
the failures are specific to the Dockerfiles, such as pull access
denied, 404 not found, etc.
The final curated dataset contains 248 buildable and
runnable Dockerfiles. They are spread over 124 open-
source Java projects which use Docker. Figure 3 describes
the complexity, popularity, and maturity of the covered
projects, with respect to the amount of source code,
GitHub stars, the number of commits, and the number
of contributors. We consolicate and share the metadata
for these Dockerfiles: base images, arguments, commands,
and entrypoints: https://github.com/KTH/royal-chaos/
tree/master/pobs.
4 TECHNICAL APPROACH
The goal of POBS is to support developers in evaluating the
resilience of their Dockerized Java applications. To this end,
POBS automatically weaves in the observability and fault
injection capabilities in Docker images. In this section, we
present the POBS architecture, the key design choices, and
the implementation decisions of our prototype.
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Lines of All Code
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Fig. 3: Characteristics of the 124 Curated Projects
4.1 Working Example
Let us recall the example of Listing 1, where developers
have a Dockerfile building atop the openjdk:8-jdk base
image. First, POBS generates an augmented base image
called openjdk-pobs:8-jdk. This new base image con-
tains the POBS observability and fault injection modules.
Second, the developers do a single line change in their
application Dockerfile to increase observability: they re-
place the instruction FROM openjdk:8-jdk with FROM
openjdk-pobs:8-jdk, resulting in an augmented appli-
cation image. After initializing a container with this aug-
mented application image, the fault injection module out-
puts a file which contains the information of fault injection
points. Then, the developers can configure the fault injection
module to activate different fault injection points at runtime,
so that a specific type of failure is injected into the container.
By actively injecting failures and monitoring the container,
developers are able to evaluate how resilient the application
is with respect to the injected failures.
4.2 Design of POBS
The POBS pipeline extends the standard Docker workflow
introduced in subsection 2.1. Figure 4 presents the pipeline.
The POBS pipeline contains one procedure (shown as an
orange box in Figure 4) and two modules for observability
and fault injection (shown as orange cubes in Figure 4).
The base image generation procedure, discussed in sub-
section 4.3, adds the observability and the fault injection
modules on top of a base image. The observability module
improves the observability of an application container by
monitoring different kinds of information such as JVM
metrics, web and database transactions, etc. (more details in
subsection 4.4). The fault injection module is able to actively
inject runtime failures into the application for assessing
resilience, focusing on Java exceptions [44]. It triggers the
application’s error-handling code on purpose so that the ob-
servability module captures some abnormal behavior (more
details in subsection 4.5).
The key design principle for POBS is to minimize the
impact on the regular workflow to develop containerized
applications. First, POBS has a minimal manual action:
the modification of one single line in the Dockerfile. Sec-
ond, POBS takes care of keeping the original dependencies
needed by the application in the base image (shown as a
blue cube in Figure 4). Hence, the augmented application
image still meets, by construction, the functionality require-
ment.
Today, many developers use continuous integration and
deployment (CI/CD) techniques to automatically test their
applications and deliver production application images. It is
possible to make POBS a part of the CI/CD pipeline, so that,
for every change, an augmented application image with the
same functionality but improved observability is built and
deployed into production.
4.3 Augmented Base Image Generation
As introduced in subsection 2.2, conducting resilience as-
sessment experiments requires observability and fault in-
jection capabilities. The augmented base image generator
is designed to address this issue by automatically adding
observability and fault injection capabilities into Docker
base images. The first step to build an application Docker
image is to specify a base image in its Dockerfile (cf. sub-
section 2.1). Hence, POBS augments the base image declared
in an application Dockerfile, in order to add observability.
Considering the example Dockerfile in Listing 1, its
augmented version is shown in Listing 2. The instructions
added by the generator are used to 1) copy the files of
the observability module and the fault injection module, 2)
create folders to save outputs such as logs, 3) set up a series
of environment variables which are necessary for setting up
fault injection experiments, and 4) expose some ports so that
developers are able to access a monitoring dashboard for a
running container.
1 FROM openjdk:8-jdk
2 RUN apt-get install ...
3 COPY ./observability_module/ /home/
4 COPY ./fault_injection_module/ /home/
5 RUN mkdir /home/logs && chmod -R a+rw /home/logs
6 ENV FI_MODE throw_e
7 ...
8 EXPOSE 4000
Listing 2: A Transformed Dockerfile for Base Image
Augmentation
There are many different popular base images for Java
(cf. subsection 3.2). In order to automatically generate
augmented base images for each of them, our generator
addresses the following two challenges.
Package manager identification The first challenge is that
these Docker images have different package managers in-
stalled. For example, the image openjdk:8-jdk-alpine
uses apk 5 as package manager. Others use apt 6, typically
found in the Debian/Ubuntu-based images. POBS is able to
infer the correct installation command (line 2 in Listing 2)
for different base images.
User access control The second challenge is that, for some
base images, a specific user runs the installation commands
instead of the root user. This may prevent the generator
from installing necessary tools and copying files. POBS
addresses this challenge by checking the user name used
in the base image first. If the username is not root, POBS
adds an instruction USER root first when augmenting the
5. https://wiki.alpinelinux.org/wiki/Alpine_Linux_package_
management
6. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/APT_(software)
5POBS pipeline
Augmented base
image generation
docker pull
Base image
"foo"
Docker engine
FROM foo
...
RUN ...
COPY ...
EXPOSE ...
ENTRYPOINT ...
An application Dockerfile
Augmented base image
Image registry
Observability module
Fault injection module
FROM foo-pobs ...
Modified Dockerfile
(eg in CI)
docker build
Augmented application image
Application image
docker run
docker push
Fig. 4: The POBS Pipeline for Docker Image Augmentation
TABLE 1: Case-based Strategies in the Base Image Generator
Priority Match
Pattern
Usage
3 ImageName:Tag Specific snippet for one Dockerfile which uses
ImageName:Tag as a base image.
2 ImageName Specific snippet for all Dockerfiles which use
ImageName as a base image and do not
match layer 3.
1 Default All the other Dockerfiles which do not match
the above templates.
base image. After running all the commands requiring root,
the user is switched back to the original one.
Technically, the POBS base image generator addresses
these two challenges through a case-based strategy for
content generation. As described in Table 1, the generator
selects a sequence of instructions to be injected according to
the original base image name and tag. For example, given
a base image called foo:bar, the generator searches for
instructions for image name foo, tag bar first. If there
is no specific tag in the dictionary, the generator searches
for generic instructions for image foo. Finally, it uses a
default instruction sequence to generate an augmented base
image. By providing different instructions for different im-
ages and tags, the generator is able to use a corresponding
package manager for dependency installation. If base image
foo:bar uses a different username and group instead of
root, extra instructions about switching users are added to
solve permission issues.
4.4 Observability Module
In order to evaluate an application’s error-handling capabil-
ities, sufficient monitoring is important. The observability
module provides multiple layers of monitoring. We handled
three layers of monitoring information: 1) information on
about the Java classes that are loaded in the virtual machine
(class names, method names, checked exception types) 2)
JVM metrics like heap memory usage, CPU workload, and
network I/O, and 3) application-specific metric.
The application-specific metrics enable the developers
to have fine grain data about their production system. For
example, for a web application, one application-specific
metric is the number of 200 response codes per second.
To do this, the developers specify what class and method
need to be instrumented, and what code variable or event
to collect.
The observability data can be queried. The observability
module provides an HTTP API to query the monitored met-
rics. By sending a post request to the observability module,
together with the metric name, start time and end time, the
module responses a series of metric values in JSON.
4.5 Fault Injection Module
The fault injection module is designed to inject different
kinds of failure into a Java application. This module instru-
ments Java bytecode when a class is loaded into the JVM.
The injector interface enables the developers to implement
different fault models. By default, the perturbation injection
module injects checked exceptions 7. If a method declares to
throw exceptions, the fault injection module identifies it as
an instrumentation target. As shown in Listing 3, method
foo() declares to throw exception EA and EB, thus there
are two fault injection points in this method, each of them is
controlled separately.
1 void foo() throws EA, EB {
2 // injected code when this class is loaded
3 PAgent.throwExceptionPerturbation(key1);
4 PAgent.throwExceptionPerturbation(key2);
5 ...
6 }
Listing 3: The Default Perturbation Model in The Fault
Injection Module
For the fault injection module to work properly, some
options need to be set up when the application is started
up. The fault injection module takes options by extracting
different environment variables. In this way, developers are
able to configure the fault injection module by giving extra
environment variables such as docker run -e foo=bar
.... The complete list of supported configurations is pre-
sented in Table 2. Option FILTER and EFILTER control
the range of bytecode instrumentations done by the fault
injection module. By defining these two options, fault in-
jection experiments could be focused on specific packages
and exception types. Option MODE is used to specify which
7. A checked exception in Java is an exception that must be either
handled in a try-catch block, or declared to be thrown in the method
where it could occur.
6TABLE 2: Options for The Fault Injection Module
Configuration Variable Default Value and Usage
FILTER ".*", package names to be instrumented with bytecode
transformation.
EFILTER ".*", methods which declare to throw the matched
exception types are instrumented.
RATE "1", the probability of exception injections.
MODE "throw_e", the mode to be used for fault injection
experiments.
DEFAULTMODE "off", whether to inject exceptions as soon as the fault
injection point is reached.
CSVPATH "logs/perturbationPointsList.csv", path to a file which
stores the detected fault injection points.
COUNTDOWN "1", the maximum number of thrown exceptions for
each fault injection point.
perturbation model will be used by the fault injection
module. If developers implement their own perturbation
mode, they could activate it by changing this option. Option
RATE, DEFAULTMODE and COUNTDOWN are set to control the
behavior of each perturbation injector.
The fault injection module, together with the observabil-
ity module, enables developers to conduct fault injection
experiments for resilience assessment. When a fault is in-
jected by the fault injection module, it may or not have an
influence on the metrics being monitored by the observabil-
ity module. To detect whether a specific injected fault leads
to the application’s abnormal behavior, POBS uses causal
impact analysis. The principle of causal impact analysis is:
1) it considers a period of monitoring data without any fault
injection as input, 2) it analyzes the monitoring data and
formalizes a prediction model, 3) it compares the values
of the monitored metric during fault injection experiments
against the predicted values, and 4) if a significant difference
between the real values and the prediction is detected, the
injected failure is considered to have a causal impact on the
monitored metric.
4.6 Implementation
The POBS base image generator and all the orchestration
scripts are written in Python 3. The fault injection module
is an enhanced version of TripleAgent [44]. The observ-
ability module is implemented using Glowroot 8, a low-
overhead application performance management tool for
JVM. For causal impact analysis, we use Google’s library
CausalImpact [16] implemented in Python. For the sake
of open-science, the code is made publicly available at
https://github.com/KTH/royal-chaos/tree/master/pobs.
5 EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY
The evaluation of POBS is based on the following research
questions.
• RQ1: To what extent do base images, augmented by
POBS, preserve the functionality of the original Docker
base images?
• RQ2: To what extent are base images augmented by
POBS successful at increasing observability of real-
world Dockerized Java applications?
8. https://glowroot.org/
• RQ3: To what extent are augmented base images useful
for fault injection analysis of real-world Dockerized
Java applications?
• RQ4: What is the impact on performance of the aug-
mented base image?
5.1 Methodology for RQ1
In order to test whether the observability module and the
fault injection module are successfully integrated into a base
image, we perform two checks: 1) whether a ‘docker build’
of the augmented image succeeds 2) whether a simple Java
application can run successfully on top of this augmented
base image, in two modes.
For the second check, we need an application. For RQ1,
we use a demo application, called ‘DLIEEE‘ for short.
This application consists of downloading the official IEEE
latex package on the internet. It contains one class which
uses Apache’s Commons IO 9 library to download the file.
There is one method downloadTheFile() which declares
to throw InterruptedExceptions and IOExceptions.
These two exceptions are the target for the fault injection
module.
We perform these two checks for all the base images in
our dataset, as presented in section 3. There is one DLIEEE
image per base image, which is tested with the following
two experiments:
Mode A Both the observability module and the fault
injection module print a message in a log to declare their
successful attachment. This test passes if the file is success-
fully downloaded with the correct checksum.
Mode B Both the observability module and the fault
injection module are successfully attached as well. In addi-
tion, the fault injection is activated and an IOException is
injected at the beginning of method downloadTheFile().
The container thus fails to download the file. This test
passes if no file is downloaded and if an exception injection
message is detected in the container’s log output.
To sum up, an augmented base image is considered valid
if and only if: 1) docker build succeeds; 2) DLIEEE passes
the mode A test; 3) DLIEEE passes the mode B test.
5.2 Methodology for RQ2
Now we consider the application images. Since RQ2 focuses
on the observability improvement, the fault injection mod-
ule is set to off. Next for each Dockerfile, we perform three
steps.
5.2.0.1 Step 1, Generate An Augmented Base Image
for The Dockerfile: The POBS base image generator, pre-
sented in subsection 4.3, builds an augmented version for
the base image of the Dockerfile under study. The new aug-
mented base image contains the observability module and
the fault injection module, which are used in the following
steps.
5.2.0.2 Step 2, Build The Dockerfile Using The Aug-
mented Base Image: If an augmented base image is success-
fully created, the original application Dockerfile is updated
by replacing the FROM instruction, e.g. ‘FROM openjdk‘ to
‘FROM openjdk-pobs‘. Then the docker build command
is used to build the augmented application image.
9. https://commons.apache.org/proper/commons-io/
75.2.0.3 Step 3, Run The Container: In the final step
of the experiment we launch docker run to execute the
Java application in a container and we check that the ob-
servability module is working correctly. We consider that
observability is improved if the following criteria hold: 1)
the observability module outputs a successful attachment
message in the container log, 2) the JVM metrics, such as
heap memory usage, can be extracted via the observability
module API, and 3) the container continuously runs for at
least 1 minute without a crash.
5.3 Methodology for RQ3
We answer RQ3 in a qualitative manner. We carefully select
an application from our dataset according to the follow-
ing selection criteria: 1) the application contains at least
one Dockerfile which passes all the observability tests in
subsection 5.2, because fault injection requires augmented
observability, 2) the application is medium-sized and could
be deployed in the lab server (it does not require a specific
cluster or database) and 3) the general usage of the appli-
cation is sufficiently documented in the GitHub repository.
According to the criteria above, Grobid10 is selected as the
experimental target for fault injection. Grobid is a tool that
extracts information from scholarly documents. It contains
more than 60K lines of Java code and has more than 1,000
stars on GitHub.
The fault injection experiments are conducted according
to the following steps. First, we try to build the application
in order to get necessary application jar files (same step as
in subsection 3.3). Second, the POBS base image generator
is applied to build an augmented base image, which is
used to build an augmented application image. Then by
initializing an application container and feeding it with user
workload, we get all the fault injection points information
from the fault injection module. The workload for Gro-
bid consists in passing a research paper PDF to Grobid’s
processHeaderDocument API. This API returns the main
metadata of the input PDF document in an XML format. [6]
For each fault injection point, we first keep the fault
injection point deactivated and exercise the container with
a workload for 5 minutes. Then a specific fault injection
point is activated, and the same workload is used as input
for another 5 minutes. Then, the ’normal’ run is used as a
reference to identify abnormal behavior.
There are two different kinds of abnormal behavior
to be analyzed by the experiments: 1) correctness: every
response from the API is compared to a reference response,
to calculate whether the API still behaves properly under
fault injection; 2) performance: a causal impact analysis is
conducted on the monitored performance metrics, to detect
whether the metrics are impacted by the injected failures.
By querying the monitoring module via its HTTP API,
the usage of heap memory in JVM is exported as an exam-
ple for causal impact analysis of performance issues. The
monitoring data is saved in a JSON file which contains a
set of timestamp-value pairs. The timestamp at which the
fault injection module begins to inject exceptions is also
provided for impact analysis. Then the monitoring data is
used as input to Google’s CausalImpact tool. CausalImpact
10. https://github.com/kermitt2/grobid
outputs two values as an analysis result: 1) the probability
of obtaining a causal impact by chance in the posterior area,
denoted as p-value, and 2) the relative effect on average
in the posterior area, denoted as re. A smaller p-value
from CausalImpact indicates that re is more statistically
significant. A larger re signifies a more severe impact from
the fault injection point.
5.4 Methodology for RQ4
We evaluate the performance overhead caused by base
image augmentation, by running the same experiment tar-
get and workload as RQ3. The overhead is evaluated at
three different levels: the image level, the running container
level, and the application level. At the image level, we
measure the disk size increase of the image. This is queried
by the command docker images. At the container level,
we capture the CPU usage and memory usage. At the
application level, we measure the average response time
of Grobid’s API processHeaderDocument. Two runs are
made: a normal execution using the original application
image (reference group), and an execution using the aug-
mented base image without injecting any failure. We do not
evaluate the performance overhead during fault injection
because the abnormal behavior caused by injected failures
may be related to performance. All executions are made
for 5 minutes, including 300 calls to the API. For statistical
purposes, the same measurement is collected 30 times to
calculate the average. [12]
6 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We now present our experimental results based on the
methodologies presented in section 5. RQ1 focuses on
Docker base images, RQ2 on application images and RQ3
on a fault injection case study.
6.1 RQ1. Creating POBS base images
The dataset introduced in subsection 3.3 includes 248 Dock-
erfiles located in 124 projects. This represents 107 unique
base images. The POBS pipeline can create a valid aug-
mented base image for 93 of these 107 base images.
The augmented base images passed the evaluation tests
mentioned in subsection 5.1. They successfully maintain the
original functionalities and provide new monitoring and
fault injection capabilities. In order to be contribute useful,
novel artifacts to the research and Docker community, we
have publicly released, on Docker Hub, the augmented
based images for the 25 most popular base images of
our dataset. Overall, this first experiment shows the wide
applicability of our approach.
Let us consider the most popular base image, java:8, as
an example here. The application “DLIEEE” uses Listing 4
to build its Docker image. POBS pipeline successfully builds
an augmented base image called java-pobs:8 first. Then
the augmented base image is used to build and run a
“DLIEEE” container. This container passes test experiments
with both mode A and mode B described in subsection 5.1,
which means both the observability module and the fault
injection module are successfully attached and the fault in-
jection module succeeds in injecting the specific exceptions.
8Compared to the original “DLIEEE” application image, the
augmented image provides both the extra observability and
the capability of conducting fault injection experiments.
1 FROM java:8
2 WORKDIR /root
3 # install openjdk8 if java is not installed
4 COPY ./install_openjdk8.sh /root
5 RUN ./install_openjdk8.sh
6 # run the application
7 COPY ./DLIEEE.jar /root
8 ENTRYPOINT ["java", "-jar", "DLIEEE.jar"]
Listing 4: The DLIEEE Dockerfile Using java:8 as The Base
Image
We now analyze the 14 failure cases, where our approach
did not yield valid POBS base images. The most common
failure, which occurs in 9 out of 14 failure cases, is related
to the Java version used in the base image. Since the POBS
fault injection module leverages some capabilities that are
available only in Java 8+, we cannot support base images
with Java 7 or older.
The second most frequent cause for a failure (3 out of
14) is a invalid reference format error. It means that in
the original Dockerfile, variables are used to describe the
base image name and tag. For example, instruction FROM
jenkins/jenkins:$jenkins_tag needs developers to
specify the exact tag to be used. When POBS automatically
augments base images, these environment variables are left
as blank, which causes the reference format error. This could
be resolved by specifying the correct environment variables,
or mage a default tag name as latest.
Finally, there are 2 failed cases which are caused by
permissions denied. These two base images have different
permissions setup about creating folders and changing the
owner of folders. This can be resolved by adding more
templates to specifically handle such base images.
Answer to RQ1
The base image generator of POBS is effective: it suc-
cessfully generates augmented base images for 93/107
(87%) base images from the field. This is arguably a
high coverage, which could be further improved with
more engineering (eg by adding new templates for rare
base images). The concept of automatically augmenting
base images is novel in the Docker ecosystem, it has the
potential to have a wide impact for practitioners.
6.2 RQ2. Improving Observability in Application Im-
ages
We now discuss to what extent our technique can add
observability capabilities into Java application images. In
total, there are 248 application Dockerfiles under evaluation
in this research question (all those Dockerfiles that can be
built using a default docker build command, see subsec-
tion 3.3). We could run a correct build for up to 90% of these
Dockerfiles (223/248) with augmented base images.
We observe one case where an augmented base im-
age is successfully built and passes the tests in RQ1
while the application fails to build an image on top of
this augmented base image. The reason of this failure is
TABLE 3: The Relation between Unique Base Images and
Application Dockerfiles in RQ1 and RQ2
Dimension Base Image
Augmenta-
tion
Build Success Run Success
107 unique base images 93 (86.9%) 92 (86.0%) 73 (68.2%)
248 Dockerfiles 224 (90.3%) 223 (89.9%) 191 (77.0%)
Maven’s OutOfMemoryError, which means the JVM run-
ning Maven has run out of memory since now there are
more components attached to the Java process.
Next, we execute a docker run command on each of
the 223 application images that include a POBS augmented
base image. This command is successful in 191 cases (77% of
248 Dockerfiles), i.e., the application image: 1) is successfully
attached to the observability module, 2) can continuously
run for one minute without exiting exceptionally, and 3) is
able to give generic monitoring metrics via the monitoring
API.
There are 32 augmented application images that fail the
verification criteria mentioned above. The most common
failure, which covered 25 cases, is the JVM running in these
images that fails to recognize the necessary environment
variable that declares the POBS components. The remaining
7 failed cases are caused by permission errors. For example,
the POBS observability module fails to create necessary files
in the target container.
Recall that RQ1 focuses on the number of unique base
images while RQ2 focuses on the number of application
Dockerfiles. Table 3 summarizes the relation between these
two different aspects. It shows that no matter which dimen-
sion is chosen, the percentage of successful cases is com-
parable. The idea of automatically augmenting Docker base
images works for an arguably high percentage of dockerized
Java applications.
Answer to RQ2
There are 223/248 (90%) application images that could
be built based on augmented base images. With a default
docker run command, we can prove that 191/248 (77%)
augmented application images are runnable. This shows
that our approach improves observability in a fully au-
tomated manner. Developers have virtually no change to
make to their Dockerized Java applications to benefit from
automated monitoring.
6.3 RQ3. Results on Fault Injection
The fault injection module identifies 16, out of 100 fault
injection points of Grobid, as covered by the experiment
workload. By conducting one fault injection experiment per
covered fault injection point, a resilience analysis report is
computed. We summarize it in Table 4. Every row records
the basic information of a fault injection point including its
class name, method name, and thrown exception type. A
row also presents the correctness rate of all the responses,
the probability of obtaining a performance causal impact
by chance in the posterior area p-value, together with the
relative effect on average in the posterior area re.
Let us take the first fault injection point (No. 1) in
Table 4 as an example. The fault injection point is located
9TABLE 4: Resilience Evaluation for Docker Allowed by POBS (Column P-value stands for the probability of obtaining an
effect by chance. Column RE stands for the relative effect on average in the posterior area.)
No. Full Class Name Method Name Exception Type C. Rate P-value RE
1 org/grobid/core/factory/GrobidPoolingFactory destroyObject java/lang/Exception 100% 0.48 52.05
2 org/grobid/core/factory/GrobidPoolingFactory passivateObject java/lang/Exception 100% 0.43 56.74
3 org/grobid/core/sax/PDFALTOAnnotationSaxHandler endElement org/xml/sax/SAXException 100% 0.3 69.63
4 org/grobid/core/sax/PDFALTOAnnotationSaxHandler startElement org/xml/sax/SAXException 100% 0.45 54.55
5 org/grobid/core/sax/PDFMetadataSaxHandler endElement org/xml/sax/SAXException 100% 0.38 61.94
6 org/grobid/core/sax/PDFMetadataSaxHandler startElement org/xml/sax/SAXException 100% 0.43 57.24
7 org/grobid/core/factory/GrobidPoolingFactory activateObject java/lang/Exception 0% 0.03 97.4
8 org/grobid/core/factory/GrobidPoolingFactory makeObject java/lang/Exception 0% 0.45 55.34
9 org/grobid/core/engines/AuthorParser processingCitation java/lang/Exception 0% 0.2 79.92
10 org/grobid/core/engines/HeaderParser processingHeaderBlock java/lang/Exception 0% 0.46 53.75
11 org/grobid/core/sax/PDFALTOSaxHandler endElement org/xml/sax/SAXException 0% 0.23 77.22
12 org/grobid/core/sax/PDFALTOSaxHandler startElement org/xml/sax/SAXException 0% 0.32 68.13
13 org/grobid/core/features/FeaturesVectorName addFeaturesName java/lang/Exception 0% 0.47 53.15
14 org/grobid/core/features/FeaturesVectorAffiliationAddress addFeaturesAffiliationAddress java/lang/Exception 0% 0.34 66.43
15 org/grobid/core/features/FeaturesVectorCitation addFeaturesCitation java/lang/Exception 0% 0.5 50.25
16 org/grobid/core/features/FeaturesVectorDate addFeaturesDate java/lang/Exception 0% 0.43 57.14
(a) Normal Execution
(b) Fault Injection for Dockerized Java: the vertical dashed line
shows when the exceptions starts to be injected.
Fig. 5: Causal Impact Analysis of JVM Heap Memory Usage
for Point No. 7 in Grobid. The application is monitored for
10 minutes. The black solid line is the real value of the heap
memory usage. The blue dashed line shows the predicted
trend of the metric.
in class GrobidPoolingFactory, at the beginning of
method destroyObject. When the fault injection point
is activated, it keeps injecting Exception every time the
point is reached. However, even injecting these exceptions
when a PDF is sent to Grobid, 100% of the responses are
correct according to the reference output. The p-value of
observing a performance impact when activating the fault
injection point is 0.48. The relative impact, on average, of
this fault injection point is 52.05. In this case, it means that
CausalImpact does not have enough statistical evidence to
claim that the injected exceptions have a causal impact on
the JVM heap memory usage. This is good news for the
developers of Grobid, because the injected failures do not
prevent Grobid from correctly extracting the header infor-
mation from a PDF file. There is no obvious performance
overhead detected during the fault injection either.
To support engineers in understanding a causal impact
on performance metrics, CausalImpact generates a visual-
ization of the monitored information. Figure 5a and Fig-
ure 5b show the visualization of the JVM heap memory
usage data for the normal execution and fault injection
experiments of fault injection point No. 7 in Table 4. Axis
X records wall-clock time. Axis Y shows the value of the
heap memory usage. The black solid line is the real value
of the monitored data. The blue dashed line shows the pre-
dicted trend of the metric. The visualization of the normal
execution acts as a reference group. Figure 5b shows that
the container is injected with exceptions after the vertical
dashed line. There is a clear relation between the prediction
and the real monitored data. Thus an Exception which
is injected at the beginning of method activateObject,
class GrobidPoolingFactory does cause a causal impact
on the usage of heap memory in JVM. According to Table 4,
the effect is also quantified by the causal impact analysis.
The p-value of this point is 0.03, with a relatively higher
impact (97.4 on average) on the usage of heap memory.
Answer to RQ3
Our technique is able to successfully add fault injection
capabilities in Dockerized Java applications, for free for
the developer. The combination of improved observability
and fault injection enables developers to identify resilience
issues with respect to correctness and performance. With
a system like POBS, resilience engineers can debug re-
silience problems in dockerized Java applications.
6.4 RQ4. Performance Overhead Evaluation
Table 5 presents the comparison of the performance-related
metrics during the experiments. The original Grobid appli-
cation’s image is 1.57 GB. The augmented application image
is 1.61 GB, which is 2.5% larger than the original one. When
the application is deployed with the original base image, the
average CPU and memory usage are respectively 3.34% and
3.84GB. The average response time is 0.099 seconds. When
the application is deployed with the augmented base image
and the fault injection is off, the application takes 4.91%
CPU usage and 4.03GB memory usage on average which are
47.0% and 4.9% larger than the reference group respectively.
The average response time is 0.109 seconds, which is 10%
larger than the reference group.
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TABLE 5: The Performance Overhead Caused by POBS
Category Original Image Augmented Image
without FI
Image Size 1.57GB 1.61GB (2.5%)
CPU Usage 3.34% 4.91% (47.0%)
Memory Usage 3.84GB 4.03GB (4.9%)
Response Time 0.099s 0.109 (10%)
Answer to RQ4
The size of the augmented Java application only slightly
increases (2.5%), and it does not cost significant extra
storage costs. The CPU usage and memory usage are
higher by 47.0% and 4.9% respectively on average when
running the application with the augmented base image,
because of the added monitoring and observability. From
the user’s perspective, the response time is 0.01 seconds
slower, which can be considered acceptable in most use
cases.
7 THREATS TO VALIDITY
7.1 Internal Validity
The main threat to internal validity is that the fault injection
module only injects exceptions at the beginning of methods
that declare to throw exceptions. The behavior of an appli-
cation under fault injection may change if an exception is
injected in different locations of the target method. Further
work is needed to systematically analyze the fault injection
searching space.
7.2 External Validity
Regarding the methodology for research question 3, POBS is
only evaluated with two real-world Java applications, which
is a threat to the external validity. It would be interesting to
select more projects in different domains and to evaluate
how POBS works on these projects. The workload of our
experiments could be diversified in order to trigger more
fault injection points as well.
8 RELATED WORK
Our work relates to the fields of containerization, observ-
ability, and fault injection.
8.1 Containerization & Docker
Cito et al. [19], [36] conducted an extensive exploratory
study of Dockerfiles on GitHub to assess their distribution
across projects, conformance to quality guidelines, and evo-
lution between revisions. Their study, like ours, consists of
the analysis of Dockerfiles to find the most popular base
images, as well as determining if the Dockerfiles can be
successfully built. However, unlike our study, the intention
of their analysis was to investigate the usage of Docker
as a containerization tool and not as a potential target for
improved observability and fault injection. Henkel et al. [24]
analyzed a large Dockerfile corpus to implement an auto-
mated parsing, rule-mining, and rule-enforcement engine
for Dockerfiles. Their tool is meant to help practitioners in
achieving high-quality DevOps artifacts. Hassan et al. [23]
proposed RUDSEA, an approach that recommends updates
of Dockerfiles based on analyzing changes on software
environment assumptions. Oumaziz et al. [32] summarized
the practices of expert Dockerfile maintainers in order to
mitigate duplicates in Dockerfiles and how to handle them.
Instead of improving applications’ observability like POBS,
these works focus on improving the quality of Dockerfiles.
Studies have also been conducted to address issues
concerning the security of using Docker. Gao et al. [21]
investigated information leaks between multi-tenant hosts
and the containers running on them, which would allow
system-wide information to be available to a malicious con-
tainer. Lin et al. [29] evaluated real-world exploits, privilege
escalation attacks in particular, that compromise container
isolation. Zerouali et al. [42], [43] conducted a study on the
“technical lag” with respect to outdatedness and security
vulnerabilities present in official and community Docker
images based on the Debian Linux distribution. Shu et al.
[37] implemented a framework called DIVA to automate the
discovery and download of official and non-official images
on Docker Hub and the analysis of security vulnerabilities
and their propagation.
These works relate to security, but none involves the au-
tomated transformation of Dockerfiles. Our study, however,
is based on the systematic transformation of an application
Dockerfile to give observability and fault injection capabil-
ities to the application without having to change the code.
To our knowledge, automated transformation of Dockerfiles
is an original concept that has not been researched before.
8.2 Observability & Monitoring
Monitoring a distributed system is a challenging enterprise
because of the potentially large number of its constituent
components. This problem has been highlighted by Mace et
al. [30] who implemented a framework called Pivot Tracing
which combines dynamic instrumentation of components
with causal tracing techniques to collect metrics that span
across component and machine boundaries.
Picoreti et al. [35] advocated the use of multilevel ob-
servability which would include application as well as
infrastructure monitoring for the automatic orchestration of
microservices deployed on the cloud.
Observability becomes especially significant for chaos
engineering and fault injection in order to monitor the
state of the system under test before, during, and after an
experiment. Several tools such as Grafana [5], Prometheus
[9], DataDog [2], DynaTrace [11], cAdvisor [4], and others
[10] [8], allow the management, visualization, and analysis
of monitored data. Bug tech companies like Google and
Amazon also have their own observability tools such as
Operations (formerly Stackdriver) [3] and Amazon Cloud-
Watch [1], both of them require the application to be de-
ployed on their cloud infrastructure. Table 6 presents a
comparison of POBS against them 4 different dimensions:
applied platform, the level of observability, augmented base
images, and whether extensible for research. It shows that
POBS has unique features compared to those professional
tools. First, POBS does not require specific infrastructure
platforms. Second, it is the first and only tool that uses
Docker image augmentation for observability improvement.
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TABLE 6: Comparison of Existing Tools with POBS
Google Amazon
Dimension Operations CloudWatch POBS
Platform Google Cloud AWS Any platform
that supports
Docker
Observability Infra, OS Infra, OS OS, JVM
Augmented base images No No Yes
Extensible for research No No Yes
Finally, POBS’ source code and data being publicly avail-
able, it is usable and extensible for future research, contrary
to the proprietary systems of Google and Amazon.
In our approach, we improve the observability of an ap-
plication by generating an augmented base image which in-
cludes an observability module and a fault injection module.
This augmented base image then replaces the original base
image in the application’s Dockerfile. Monitoring is thus
available out-of-the-box with virtually no separate tooling
or other changes to the application code.
8.3 Fault Injection
Previous techniques and tools to perform fault injection on
distributed systems include Pumba [28], ChaosCat [38], and
Netflix’s ChaosMonkey [15].
Fault injection tools have also been implemented specif-
ically for microservice-based applications. Simonsson et al.
[39] implemented a fault injection and monitoring tool for
microservice-based applications that use Docker. This tool
analyzes the behavior of the application with respect to fault
injection on system calls. Hiorhiadi et al. [25] implemented
Gremlin, a tool that can be integrated into the production
environment and inject network-level failures by disrupting
communication between microservices of an application.
A fault injection tool called CloudVal [34] was employed
to evaluate the performance and reliability of cloud envi-
ronments based on KVM and Xen hypervisors with respect
to various fault models.
The fault injection module in POBS instruments Java
bytecode to inject exceptions. This module, in conjunction
with our observability module, allows developers to assess
the resilience of their application at a very low cost.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented POBS, a novel approach
that automatically improves the observability of Dock-
erized Java applications. By evaluating POBS on open-
source Docker applications collected on Github, we have
shown that POBS automatically improves the observability
of 93/107 base images. To our knowledge, this is is the first
time that automatic improvement of Docker applications is
studied.
As future work, we will set up a multi-version run-
time for Dockerized applications using POBS for behavior
comparison. With our industrial partners, we will integrate
POBS in a CI/CD pipeline that enables developers to have
advanced resilience engineering with zero manual effort for
each new version of their applications [13].
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